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BOOK REVIEWS
The Confirmation Mystery
THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS
PROCESS. By Stephen L. Carter. (New York: Basic Books, 1994). Pp. xii,
252. $21.00.
REVIEWED BY MICHAEL J. GERHARDT*
The confirmation process is like the weather: everyone complains, but
no one seems able to do anything about it. In fact, there has been a lot
about which to complain. Within the past decade, the Reagan, Bush, and
Clinton administrations have each had confirmation mishaps that have
been the subject of countless commentaries, including President Reagan's
failed Supreme Court nominees Robert Bork and Judge Douglas Gins-
burg; President Bush's barely successful nomination of Justice Clarence
Thomas, whose confirmation hearings were dominated by fierce racial and
sexual politics; and President Clinton's protracted, leak-ridden searches
for two Supreme Court nominees and forced withdrawals of his nomina-
tions of Zoe Baird as Attorney General, Bobby Inman as Secretary of
Defense, and Lani Guinier as head of the Civil Rights Division of the
Department of Justice.
Even though each of these incidents and many other troubled nomina-
tions' may make sense in retrospect, the confirmation process still mysti-
* Visiting Professor, Cornell Law School, 1994-95; Professor, Marshall-Wythe School of
Law, The College of William & Mary. B.A. Yale University; M.Sc. London School of
Economics; J.D. University of Chicago. I dedicate this book review to the memory of my
father Sidney Jerome Gerhardt (1925-1994), whose spirit, integrity, sense of fairness, gentil-
ity, decency, and love will always be my inspiration. I am also grateful to Erwin Chemerinsky,
Michael Herz, John McGinnis, Michel Rosenfeld, Steve Shiffrin, and Ron Wright for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts; to the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva
University for the use of its library and other resources during the summer of 1994; and to
Stephen King and Patrick Lee, Marshall-Wythe School of Law Class of 1996, and Michael
Parker, Cornell Law School Class of 1995, for their invaluable research assistance. Although
I provided volunteer counsel to the White House Counsel's office on behalf of Justice
Stephen Breyer's confirmation during the summer of 1994, the opinions expressed in this
piece are solely my own.
1. The past three administrations have each had many other confirmation difficulties. For
instance, President Reagan's other failed nominees include Brad Reynolds as Associate
Attorney General, see Aaron Freiwald, William Bradford Reynolds, AM. LAW., Mar. 1989, at
147; Robert Gates as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, see David Hoffman, CIA
Post Declined by Tower, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1987, at Al; and nineteen other people
nominated for federal district and appellate court judgeships, see Sheldon Goldman, Re-
agan's Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318 (Apr./
May 1989). President Reagan's narrowest confirmation victory was Daniel Manion's Seventh
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fies many people. No administration has ever been able to predict infallibly
which factors will undo which of its nominees. Moreover, the American
people watch confirmation proceedings in the hopes of ascertaining the
character and views of presidential nominees, hoping to gauge the Presi-
dent's agenda and better understand federal institutions that are not
usually open to close public scrutiny. The public is especially fascinated
with Supreme Court confirmation hearings, which provide the only chance
for most people to get to know the Justices, who subsequently disappear
from public view only to re-emerge later as the faceless authors of rulings
in politically or socially significant disputes.
Hence, the time is ripe for Professor Stephen Carter's book, The Confir-
mation Mess: Cleaning Up the Federal Appointments Process.2 Drawing on
many recent confirmation contests that have confounded the public, legal
scholars, and the media, Carter promises to explain "what is wrong with
our confirmation process, how it got this way, and what we can do to fix
it."3
For Carter, the major problem with the confirmation process is its focus
on disqualifying factors. He finds the root cause of this focus in the
American people's penchant for punishment, reluctance to forgive, and
inability to appreciate "sin as something ever-present in all of us."4 Thus,
Carter believes that reforming the appointment process requires us to
incorporate "the more complex metaphorical possibilities of contrition,
redemption, and forgiveness" into "our national dialogues" about confirma-
tion.' Carter further argues that the Senate should examine a judicial
F
Circuit appointment, which the Senate approved, by a single vote. Karen Tumulty, Senate
Confirms Manion 50 to 49, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 1986, at 1. President Bush's failed nominees
include William Lucas as Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, see John
Flinn, Career Objective: To Obtain Job by Using Bogus Resume, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar.
5, 1992, at 1E; Kenneth Ryskamp for the Eleventh Circuit; and several other people on
whose nominations for federal district and appellate judgeships the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee refused to act near the end of President Bush's term. See Gail Appleson, U.S. Court
Cases Hit Judicial Vacancy Bottleneck, REUTER LIBR. REP., July 21, 1992, at 1. President
Clinton's failed nominees include Gerald Torres as Assistant Attorney General for the
Lands Division. See Ronald J. Ostron, As Support Wanes, 2 Justice Dept. Nominees Withdraw,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1993, at N8.
2. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINT-
MENTS PROCESS (1994).
3. Id. at 5. The book expands upon Professor Carter's academic writings on the subject of
confirmation. For a sampling of these, see Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1185 (1988); Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess, Revisited, 84 Nw.
U. L. REV. 962 (1990); Stephen L. Carter, Bork Redux, or How the Tempting of America Led
the People to Rise and Battle for Justice, 69 TEX. L. REV. 759 (1991); Stephen L. Carter, The
Confirmation Mess, Continued, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 75 (1993); Stephen L. Carter, Why the
Confirmation Process Can't Be Fixed, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; see also A Litmus Test for the
Court?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1993, at A21; The Candidate, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 22, 1993, at
29.
4. CARTER, supra note 2, at 184.
5. Id. This argument dovetails with the main thesis of Carter's other recent book. See
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nominee's "moral instincts."6 This focus would better enable the Senate to
reflect on "the enduring and fundamental values that shape the special-
ness of the American people,",7 as well as enhancing the Court's credibil-
ity, and safeguarding judicial independence more effectively than the
current practice of treating the nominee's ideology as a potential disquali-
fier.
In response, this review maintains that Carter's critique of the confirma-
tion process conflicts with constitutional history, structure, and practice. It
is surprising that Carter, one of the nation's most respected scholars on
original understanding and separation of powers, presents a caricature of
the appointment system as it was originally conceived and designed. He
tries to describe the confirmation process without giving sufficiently serious
attention to its central component-politics. If by "politics," one means
the weighing of each nomination's and confirmation's implications for
federalism, the institutional relationships among the branches of the fed-
eral government, personal fealty to the nominee, and public accountability,
then politics drives the confirmation process by constitutional design. To
be sure, these factors may cut differently in different cases and depend a
great deal on context or circumstances, but, as a general matter, the
Appointments Clause gives the President an advantage over the Senate by
giving him the nomination power, and thus the chance to take a proactive
stance on nominations with the Senate largely confined to exercising a
veto. Carter, however, adopts a myopic view of politics as being short-
sighted, mean-spirited, self-aggrandizing, and purely partisan. By adopting
this less sophisticated understanding of politics, Carter makes the system
appear to be more of a mess than it is. For Carter, politics distracts the
confirmation process from achieving the nobler objectives of making qual-
ity appointments and preserving judicial integrity and independence. But
in practice, the system, though it does not always operate in refined or
pretty ways, rarely reaches distorted or unjust outcomes, as reflected by
Carter's ultimate failure to denounce the results of any of the confirmation
battles he surveys.
Part I of this review describes the book's major themes. Part II discusses
two major problems that cut across specific arguments in the book and
undermine the reliability of Carter's critique: (1) by most harshly criticiz-
ing the hearings that have involved his friends-Zoe Baird, Lani Guinier,
and Anita Hill-he undermines the impartiality of those criticisms; and (2)
he fails to fulfill his promise to clarify the roles performed in the confirma-
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993) (lamenting the disappearance of religion from
American political discourse).
6. CARTER, supra note 2, at 152.
7. Id. at 146.
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tion process by the President, the media, and the public.8
Part III critiques the book's major themes. Carter attacks the preoccupa-
tion with disqualifying factors that marks the confirmation process. This
focus, however, is compelled by constitutional design and the political
reality that the President and the Senate each have limited capital to
expend on confirmation battles. The main flaw with Carter's critique of
Supreme Court confirmations is that the Constitution deliberately condi-
tions judicial appointments on the political branches' unrestricted discre-
tion and, thus, does not immunize judicial independence from political
reprisal in the confirmation process.9 Furthermore, focusing on a Supreme
Court nominee's morals would not achieve Carter's aims of reducing the
friction in judicial confirmations, separating personal preference and prin-
cipled constitutional interpretation, and enhancing the Court's credibility.
Finally, Part IV discusses three problems with Carter's analyses of
proposals for improving judicial confirmations. First, Carter ignores the
relevance of the nominee search process. Second, the most attractive
constitutional amendment to him-requiring a two-thirds supermajority
for Supreme Court confirmations-is problematic because it creates a
presumption against confirmation, shifts the balance of power to the
Senate, and enhances the power of special interests. Third, the confirma-
tion process provides the solution to its errors by making the President, the
Senate, and the nominee politically accountable and thus subject to politi-
cal incentives-including public pressure-to do better.
I. CARTER'S CONFIRMATION MESS
Although Carter's The Confirmation Mess features lucid writing and
fascinating details about many confirmation conflicts, it is frustrating to
read and describe because it is repetitious and filled with digressions. It is
fair to say that, stripped to its essence, Carter's main concern is with the
''messy" process through which the confirmation system has reached its
results°--a process with which he never expressly disagrees. He rejects
8. Carter generally does an excellent job, however, in surveying other important aspects of
the confirmation process, including the significance of the nominee's testimony before the
relevant Senate committee; the contributions of interest groups and other concerned parties,
such as the American Bar Association, to the confirmation process; the strengths and
weaknesses of alternative judicial selection systems, particularly those used in the states and
during the Carter administration; and the need for life tenure for federal judges.
9. Besides the confirmation process, the Constitution authorizes only a few means for
political reprisals against the Court, including impeachment (to be conducted by the House
of Representatives and the Senate), congressional control of federal court jurisdiction, and
constitutional amendment. Although Carter does not discuss impeachment in his book, he
suggests that the problem with each of these other mechanisms is that "in a power struggle
mediated by democratic politics, the unpopular Court would lose." CARTER, supra note 2, at
111.
10. Id. at 15.
(Vol. 83:395
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the notion that "the end justifies the means" in the confirmation process;
instead, he suggests "we are better than that."" At stake for Carter is the
honor and quality of the nominees subjected to the process and the
promise that its proper administration would have for preserving the
public's respect for democratic institutions.
With these values in mind, Carter analyzes two major topics. First, he
complains about the focus on "disqualifying factors," rather than on a
nominee's competence to serve in the post to which he or she has been
nominated. 2 He finds this focus problematic because we lack consensus
on what suffices to disqualify judicial nominees, and thus the confirmation
process is left with "no rules whatever."' 3 According to Carter, this ab-
sence of consensus produces a vacuum into which personal and partisan
animosity, distortions, negative portrayals, and confusion creep. This sce-
nario is "bad" because it "is likely to weaken [democratic] institutions.' 14
According to Carter, this focus on disqualifying factors derives in part
from the confirmation process' reliance on a "presumption in favor of
confirmation," which invites a "search for that single tantalizing disquali-
fier with which one hopes to spark a firestorm of criticism."' 5 He criticizes
this presumption as conflicting with the Framers' intention that the confir-
mation process would check presidential discretion in making appoint-
ments and policy, and with the dominant practice during the nineteenth
century of presidential consultation with the Senate about federal appoint-
ments.1 6 Carter tells us that the turning point-at least for cabinet posts-
was in 1877 during President Rutherford B. Hayes' administration. By
insisting on the unfettered right to name his cabinet without significant
Congressional consultation, President Hayes "established the principle of
presidential autonomy in staffing the executive branch, and thereby set the
tone for the modern confirmation process.'
17
According to Carter, a second source of the focus on disqualifying
11. Id. at 52.
12. Id. at 159.
13. Id. at 29.
14. Id. at 30-31.
15. Id. at 159.
16. Id. at 35.
17. Id. at 34. Carter explains, for example, that, "[e]ven including the rather chaotic first
six months of the Clinton administration, only 7 of over 250 cabinet-level nominees have
been defeated or withdrawn since World War II." Id. at 32. He notes that five of the seven
defeats "involved, at some level or other, a scandal .... They have to: based on the record,
there is simply no other way to defeat a President's cabinet choice except to make the case
that the individual has done something terrible in previous life." Id. at 34. One of the other
two rejected nominees was Theodore Sorenson, "whom President Carter nominated in 1977
to be Director of Central Intelligence, and who faced a variety of attacks from his enemies,
among them that he lacked relevant background in intelligence work." Id. at 33. The other
defeated nominee was President Eisenhower's first choice as Secretary of Commerce, Lewis
Strauss, who was rejected because "the Senate simply got fed up with [his] arrogance and
self-promotion." Id. at 34.
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factors is the American psyche. He condemns the American public's
penchant, to which the media caters, for "digging up dirt" on public
officials.18 He suggests the American people prefer "to gossip"' 9 than to
discuss "policies and qualifications.7
20
In addition, "the reason that opponents try to paint controversial nomi-
nees as sinners ... is that they know'the American people ... like to see
the sinful destroyed ... [and] do not like to forgive.",21 Carter views the
problem as the public's "puritanical streak," which hinders its apprecia-
tion of an individual's inherent propensity to sin and "makes redemption,
even of the penitent, all but impossible. 22 Once we recognize, as Christian
theology teaches, "our shared sinfulness, we might instead have the moral
obligation to listen for the possibility of genuine contrition, which might in
turn demand of us a degree of forgiveness.7 23 At present, though, "we do
not reward contrition. Zoe Baird, who was the one who brought up her
[failure to pay Social Security taxes on her nanny] in the first place,
apologized for it and was thrown overboard.
24
Carter describes yet another source of the focus on disqualifiers as the
public's failure "to treat public service as a calling rather than a reward.,
25
This view tends to attract people to work for the government for selfish
reasons and to increase the chances for special interests to contest nomina-
tions as if they were trophies. Carter proposes that we should think of
government service as a chance
to labor on behalf of the country, to offer a fair return for what the
nation has given. The question, then, should not be whether the nominee
"deserves" the position, as though the job is a quid pro quo for years of
moral rectitude. The question should be whether this person is capable
of honorable service of which [the nation] will be glad.26
18. Id. at 16.
19. Id. at 18.
20. Id. at 16.
21. Id. at 11.
22. Id. at 11. Carter explains that Americans "often show so little patience with wrongdo-
ing by those who are in public life," because they are "unable to get [their] minds around
such abstractions as the concept of sin." Id. at 183.
23. Id. at 184.
24. Id. at 185.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 186; see also id. at 205 (arguing that the confirmation process for Justices and, by
analogy, for other confirmable posts, works best "when we learn once more to treat the role
of Justice as simply a job. Not a prize, but a job-a job not everybody wants-and a job that,
if done well, will mean working without a scintilla of loyalty to movement or cause."). If the
Senate must persist, however, in focusing on a nominee's disqualifications in confirmation
proceedings, Carter suggests a "spectrum of disqualifying factors" for the Senate to follow.
Id. at 160. He would find a nominee's lack of basic job qualifications completely disqualify-
ing, and so too, usually, a lack of the public's respect. For this reason he thinks President
Clinton was probably right to withdraw Lani Guinier's nomination to be the Assistant
THE CONFIRMATION MYSTERY
The second major theme of Carter's book consists of his complaints
about Supreme Court confirmations. He suggests that after the Warren
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education,27 confirmations became
contentious because of the popular belief that the Court is a "national
policymaker," and therefore controlling its composition is an effective way
to direct its policymaking. 28 Brown changed the confirmation process be-
cause
once the Court signaled its willingness to be one of the engines of social
change, the battleground shifted, both for those who wanted to make
society different and for those who wanted to make sure it stayed the
same. [It] is only since Brown that the Court has become a prize worth
spending immense political capital to win.29
In Carter's opinion, the obsessive concern in confirmations with a judi-
cial nominee's ideology as a potential disqualifier seriously threatens judi-
cial independence. It turns hearings into the functional equivalent of
popular elections to pick the Justices whose approaches to enforcing the
countermajoritarian values of the Constitution are most acceptable to the
majority. The danger is that, "if presidents and senators are encouraged to
exercise the prerogative of appointing Justices who will do what the public
wants, we can safely predict that the era of the Court as an important
bulwark against majority tyranny will end." 30
In the mid to late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, for example, senators
Attorney General for civil rights because "the vicious campaign against her had made it
impossible for her to do the job effectively." Id. at 167. Deeply immoral conduct provides a
somewhat weaker case for disqualification; it is "rarely curable," id. at 178, but probably not
for nominees who have been members of racially discriminatory clubs, because "it is the
habit of mind that makes membership possible and comfortable, not the fact that the
membership exists, that is the problem." Id. at 172. Illegal conduct, however, need not be
disqualifying; the critical question is "whether the law involved is related to the task for
which the individual has been nominated, whether those violations are consequential or
inconsequential, how those who violate the laws in question are generally treated ... and
whether the nominee has made appropriate amends for the illegality." Id. at 173. Carter
suggests that curable lapses might include, for example, a minor traffic infraction or even the
failure to pay Social Security taxes on domestic help, though that lapse undermined Zoe
Baird's nomination as Attorney General, "as long as [the nominees] pay the taxes and
penalties due .... Id. at 174; see also id. (suggesting that drug use is a more difficult case,
because it is "dangerous" but "it blinks at reality to deny, given the self-indulgence of the
baby-boom generation, that our government is likely chock-full of people who tried drugs as
teens or even as adults").
27. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. CARTER, supra note 2, at 205-06; see also id. at 57 (referring to the persistent "desire
to nudge [the Court's] power, that independent, mystical force, in one direction or another-
or, better still, to give it a hard shove. Yielding to that splendid temptation, we have no
choice but to ask the nominees questions that will help us predict their votes.").
29. Id. at 77.
30. Id. at 117.
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questioned Supreme Court nominees-including William Brennan, John
Marshall Harlan, Potter Stewart, and Thurgood Marshall-about their
respective support for Brown and other activist rulings by the Warren
Court.31 Carter notes further that, after Brown, presidents have tried to
control the Court's policymaking through the appointment process. This
tendency culminated with Presidents Reagan and Bush, who turned judi-
cial selection into a science for the purpose of "structuring the member-
ship of the courts in ways that would turn back what was seen as a roiling
tide of liberal activism."32
Carter's proposed solution is to focus our attention on a Supreme Court
nominee's "strongest moral commitments ' 33 because a "judge's back-
ground moral vision and degree of moral reflectiveness [shape] her interpre-
tive conclusions."34 He explains that constitutional interpretation always
involves "a crucial moment when the interpreter's own experience and
values become the most important data., 35 Thus, what matters most in
picking a Supreme Court Justice and enhancing the Court's credibility is
the "sort of moral philosophers" on the Court.3 6
In the final part of his book, Carter considers various proposals for
reforming Supreme Court confirmations. He rejects several proposals that
do not require constitutional amendment, such as eliminating television
coverage of the hearings or preventing the nominee or interest groups
from testifying, because such changes would not prompt the Senate or the
President to improve their respective confirmation performances. Carter
praises the idea of requiring a supermajority Senate vote for Supreme
Court confirmation because such a process would pressure the President
into "find[ing] a potential Justice [who was] not strongly identified with an
ideological movement[; it] would screen out nominees who were per-
ceived, rightly or wrongly, as narrow-minded[; and] it would not screen out
quality.",37 If the pressure to pick Justices on the basis of ideology were to
persist, Carter believes that the most "honest" solution would then be to
have judicial elections. 38
31. Id. at 58, 62-63, 67, 68.
32. Id. at 71.
33. Id. at 114.
34. Id. at 152.
35. Id. at 151.
36. Id. at 152; see also id. at 153 ("The popular sense should come to be one of a good,
trusted, upstanding individual sitting on the bench, so that even when the people dislike her
work, they will obey her-not simply because of her legal authority but because she is
someone held in respect.").
37. Id. at 197.
38. Id. at 203. He explains further that judicial selection as well as a public referendum
would "be doing directly what we now do indirectly: using all means, fair or foul, to influence
public opinion. The difference would be that we would suddenly be honest about what we
are doing-and that the public opinion itself would be decisive rather than merely influen-
tial." Id.
[Vol. 83:395
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Carter concludes, however, that we should not amend the Constitution
because such a change might irreparably damage the Constitution and
because
the true solution to the Supreme Court confirmation mess lies in our
ability to develop a public rhetoric about the Constitution that does not
treat the Court as though the results it reaches are all that matters.
[T]hat change would require that we rethink our attitude about the
Court and its place in our society. 39
The appropriate attitudes, Carter suggests, are to "think of [public service]
as a calling; ... to ask whether [our nominees] will be good at the job;
[and] to envision [the Court] as a check on what the democratically elected
branches do .... ,,4 0
II. THE MAJOR GAPS IN CARTER'S CONFIRMATION MESS
A. CARTER'S LACK OF IMPARTIALITY
Rather than focus on the specific problems with particular arguments in
the book, this Part examines the major gaps in Carter's discussion that
preclude the book from being comprehensive or providing an accurate
picture of the federal appointments process. The first such problem is that
his personal ties to Zoe Baird, Lani Guinier, and Anita Hill cast doubt on
the objectivity of his criticisms of the confirmation battles involving each of
them. This proximity gives Carter valuable insights into those plroceedings,
but it also undermines his credibility as a neutral judge of those events.
For instance, in assessing the second phase of Justice Thomas' confirma-
tion hearings in which Anita Hill charged him with having sexually ha-
rassed her during his tenure as the Chairman of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Carter laudably admits his "bias: I believe the
charges. Anita Hill is a personal friend of long standing, and, to me, the
notion that she would invent such a story is ludicrous."41 He further
39. Id. at 204. He explains that the specific problems with our perception of the Court are
that we rely on the Court "to correct what we often view as the errors of the [elected]
branches of government;" we believe that the Constitution provides an answer to every
tough moral question; and we think that reforming society is more easily achieved by having
the Court make policy because it requires influencing at most five Justices, rather than by
using "the principal means through which change must come in a democracy, if the change is
to have lasting effect: the persuasion of our fellow citizens." Id.
40. Id. at 206.
41. Id. at 140. Carter also wonders why, if Hill were part of a conspiracy to frustrate the
nomination of then-Judge Thomas, no one has
come up with a reason why [Hill's] fabrication should be so meager: if you are going
to tell a lie, runs the wisdom, tell a big one .... Why manufacture a story of
continued abuse over time, which led some to wonder why Hill would remain in
Thomas' employ, when one could instead claim that the harassment came suddenly
and late?
1994]
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acknowledges that he "provided the Judiciary Committee with a sworn
declaration attesting to Hill's veracity., 42 Although a person involved in an
event is free to analyze it, Carter leaves his readers with no choice but to
figure that their agreement with Carter's final judgment on the Thomas
hearings-that Thomas committed perjury and that his only principled out
was to apologize for harassing Professor Hill 43 -turns on whether they
trust Carter personally, because his conclusion rests primarily on informa-
tion to which the readers are not privy. Carter's argument on this point is
hardly convincing because it essentially restates the affidavit he submitted
on Hill's behalf in the hearings.
Carter is also to be commended for noting that Zoe Baird's "husband,
Paul Gewirtz, is a colleague of mine at Yale Law School." 44 He further
admits that President Clinton could have reasonably decided not to ex-
pend any of his limited political capital on Baird's behalf.45 Yet Carter
never considers how Baird might have contributed to her own downfall.4 6
Indeed, three factors related to Baird's conduct help to explain her failed
nomination. First, Baird's lapse of judgment caused her nomination to fall
short of the public's expectations, which had been raised as a result of
President Clinton's insistence that he would hold his cabinet nominees to
the highest ethical standards and that the appointment process would
proceed without "politics as usual."4 7 Second, it is reasonable for the
Senate and the American people to expect the Attorney General to meet a
higher standard of conduct than other citizens, especially if the nominee
had been notified of the applicability of a law prior to her breach of it and
Id. He concludes that "Hill's testimony was simply too unadorned to be either a vengeful
falsification or the result of a bizarre erotomaniacal fantasy." Id.
42. Id. at 139.
43. See id. at 184.
44. Id. at 27.
45. Id. at 167.
46. In contrast, Carter criticizes another Clinton nominee, Admiral Bobby Inman, for
contributing to his own downfall. Carter notes that Inman "withdrew his name [for consider-
ation as Secretary of Defense] and accused a syndicated columnist of conspiring with Senate
Republicans to sabotage his candidacy .... [Inman's] defensive, accusatory attitude during
his [final] press conference convinced many observers that he would in any case not have
been a successful defense secretary." Id. at 8 n.*.
47. Steve Berg, Clinton Gets Serious Message About Higher Ethics, STAR TRIB., Jan. 23,
1993, at 1A; see also Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1993, at A20. This is a variation of a
problem identified by Carter in which presidents raise unreasonable expectations for the
public by describing their nominees as the "best qualified" persons for the posts to which
they are nominated. CARTER, supra note 2, at 30. To be sure, it is possible that no one pays
much attention to such remarks because they are so commonplace. Nevertheless, the
problem for nominees already wounded by some other problem is that their nominations
might be further weakened by the gap between their actual credentials and the President's
representations.
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would have been, upon confirmation, responsible for its administration.48
Third, Baird's background did little to counterbalance the attacks made
against her.4 9 She had no national reputation, and liberal interest and
women's groups gave little, if any, support to her nomination because it
was unclear how her primary professional experience as an insurance
defense counsel qualified her as Attorney General.5 °
Similarly, Carter's eagerness to defend Lani Guinier, for whose new
book he writes the foreword,51 leads him to spend seven pages explaining
her views on voting rights,52 while failing to assess the President's reasons
for not vigorously defending her. In fact, a major reason for her failed
48. See Sidney Blumenthal, Adventures in Babysitting, NEW YORKER, Feb. 15, 1993, at
53-61; see also Robert Green, Clinton Gets Painful Lesson from Baird Nomination, Reuters,
Jan. 23, 1993. Rather than acknowledge the public's legitimate expectations, Carter launches
into a four page critique of the constitutionality of Social Security laws that require people
to pay certain taxes on their domestic help. See CARTER, supra note 2, at 179-82. It is also
unlikely that, if the Social Security laws were as silly as Carter contends, Baird would have
had the moral authority as Attorney General to do anything about them.
49. Blumenthal, supra note 48, at 58.
50. Zoe Baird should be creoited, however, with notifying transition officials prior to her
nomination of her and her husband's failure to pay certain Social Security taxes. See supra
note 25 and accompanying text. Ironically, she probably would have been confirmed if she
had not been so forthright; indeed, an important reason for the widespread perception of
the unfairness of Baird's forced withdrawal is that the Senate confirmed several of President
Clinton's other nominees who had a similar problem, including Justice Stephen Breyer, see
CARTER, supra note 2, at 6, Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown and Assistant Attorneys
General Eleanor Acheson and Walter Dellinger, see Michael Isikoff, Clinton Nominates 7 to
Justice; Housekeeper Issue Raised, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1993, at A20 (describing Clinton
nominees' efforts to comply with the Social Security tax, and citing administration officials'
argument that failure to pay the tax should not be a bar to government service). Even so, as
reflected in numerous editorials calling for the withdrawal of Baird's nomination, several
factors justified the disparate treatment accorded Baird, including her dubious credentials,
President Clinton's heightened expectations about the Attorney General's ethics, the relation-
ship between the position of Attorney General and the legal violation at issue, and Baird's
failure to comply with the law in spite of her awareness of the legal violation involved and in
spite of her undeniable ability to pay for domestic help without the same legal problems. See,
e.g., Baird's Hiring of Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1993, at B6; Baird's Law-
Breaking Should Disqualify Her, STAR TRIB., Jan. 21, 1993, at A18 (suggesting that Baird
forfeited the moral authority to provide leadership and set an example as Attorney General
because she knowingly violated the law); Richard Cohen, Special Privileges .. , WASH. POST,
Jan. 22, 1993, at A21 (suggesting that Baird's awareness of the legal violation would have
weakened her moral authority as Attorney General); Richard Estrada, Zoe Baird and the
Rule of Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 22, 1993, at A21; Patricia King, She Broke the
Law, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1993 at A21 (discounting Baird's reasons for violating the law and
suggesting that her acts left her tainted and unable to supervise immigration and other laws);
Otis Pike, Baird Withdrawal Sent the Right Message, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 23, 1993, at 17; Zoe
Baird Deserves Hard Scrutiny, ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 21, 1993, at A14 (discounting Baird's
reasons for violating the law and suggesting that Baird's acts left her unable to restore
integrity to the Justice Department).
51. See Stephen L. Carter, Foreword to LANI GUINIER, TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, at
vii-xx (1994).
52. See CARTER, supra note 2, at 38-44.
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nomination was its timing.53 Guinier's difficulties coincided with four other
troubled Justice Department nominations (only one of which Carter dis-
cusses),54 President Clinton's search for his first Supreme Court nominee,
and a fall in the President's popularity among conservative and moderate
Southern Democrats disconcerted by his early support for such notoriously
liberal causes as removing the ban against gays in the military.55 Guinier's
fate was sealed by the White House's judgment that it could achieve its
civil rights objectives with a less controversial nominee and that continuing
the fight over her nomination would further damage the rest of the
President's agenda by enmeshing him in a public debate on voting rights-a
divisive subject far afield from his domestic policy priorities.56
53. Yet another conceivable reason for Guinier's failed nomination was her arguably
inadequate defense of her views. For example, she often suggested that her position on
voting rights was similar to her four-year-old son Nikolas' suggested resolution of a situation
in which six children disagreed over which game to play, with four wanting to play tag and
two wishing to play hide-and-seek. As she explains in her book:
Nikolas ... replied, "They will play both. First they will play tag. Then they will
play hide-and-seek." [He] was right. To children, it's natural to take turns. The
winner may get to play first or more often, but even the 'loser' gets something. His
was a positive-sum solution that many adult rule-makers ignore.
GUINIER, supra note 51, at 2. The problem with this story is that it suggests that it is
permissible to guarantee the losers in a popular election a substantive outcome no matter
the reason for their preference or loss. Even if the story could somehow be construed to
make a point about the need to redraw voting districts with a history of past discrimination
to ensure minority voters a fairer process rather than a substantive outcome, it is hard to see
why people concerned about Guinier's voting rights stance would find this tale reassuring.
54. See infra notes 91-92, 94-96, and accompanying text.
55. See DeWayne Wickham, Black Caucus Must Stand Up to Clinton, USA TODAY, June 7,
1993, at A12 (suggesting that "Clinton sacrificed Guinier at the altar of political expediency"
in light of his own poor ratings and difficulty in passing his budget).
56. See Al From, Guinier Had to Go. Now., N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1993, at 21 (arguing that
Guinier's views on voting rights were inconsistent with views previously expressed by
Clinton); see also Linda P. Campbell & Michael Tackett, Race Issue, Not Radicalism, Scuttled
Guinier Nomination, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 1993, at C1 (implying that Clinton's withdrawal of
Guinier's nomination was influenced by senators who feared a difficult vote). Guinier's
forced withdrawal also leads Carter into a self-serving discussion of the reasons for hesitat-
ing to disqualify law professors from government service based on their scholarship. Carter
argues, for instance, that the Guinier episode (as well as Robert Bork's fate) might lead legal
scholars not to take "risks" in their scholarship in order to preserve their chances for
government service. CARTER, supra note 2, at 38. He concludes that "it [is] absolutely vital
[to] consider [legal scholarship in a confirmation] with care and, in particular, to remember
that a work of scholarship, in the law or any other field, is not an op-ed article." Id.
However, it is ultimately for others, such as senators and presidents, to determine the
relevance of a nominee's legal scholarship to her confirmation. Furthermore, legal scholars
are not entitled to have it both ways: they cannot critique the legal work of others,
particularly judges, and expect that, because they are engaging in acts of academic freedom,
others in an appropriate setting may not do the same to them. At present, people seeking to
become public servants are held accountable for their public acts, including their clubs,
speeches, and prior public service, as well as some private conduct such as drug use or
beating a spouse or child. The "habit of mind" that Carter condemns, for instance, in people
THE CONFIRMATION MYSTERY
B. CONFIRMATION POLITICS AND RELATIONSHIPS
Carter laments that "we are not quite sure what anybody's role [in the
confirmation process] is-the President's, the Senate's, or the public's."57
This uncertainty, however, results not from flaws in the process itself, but
from shortcomings in Carter's appreciation of these roles and their interre-
lationships. First, Carter does not fully explore the implications of the
driving force-politics-that, along with the Constitution, shapes and ex-
plains much about the interactions between key confirmation participants.
Second, he fails to identify any positive contributions made by the three
central players-the media, the public, and the Senate-in each important
confirmation battle.
1. The Original Understanding and Structure of the Confirmation Process
Carter acknowledges the political factors that presidents have consid-
ered in nominating judges or deciding whether to attempt to save a
troubled nominee,58 but he never considers the full implications of this
admission, or of the political aspects of the confirmation process. A more
sophisticated depiction of this system would have recognized that senators,
like the President, have limited political coinage to spend on confirmation
fights. It is unrealistic to assume that if a president makes nominations
based in significant part on political factors, including a judicial nominee's
ideology, senators can or should ignore those considerations in their
deliberations on a nomination.
Nor is there anything wrong with understanding the confirmation pro-
cess in political terms. Carter's analysis of the role of politics gives short
shrift to its benefits; broadly understood, politics encompasses not just
partisan maneuverings to secure power or influence policy, but also the
nobler efforts by the nation's leadership and the citizenry to comprehend
and put into practice the ideals that ultimately animate and make our
who belong to racially discriminatory clubs, id. at 172, could also be evident in one's legal
scholarship. There is no obvious reason why an academic's article should be treated differ-
ently than a brief written by a law professor, a judge, a legislator, or a practitioner. At the
very least, a legal scholar's publications are public acts, presumably undertaken for the
purpose of persuading, stimulating, or informing others. Accordingly, legal scholars inter-
ested in government service should be prepared to explain, like any other nominee, their
public records.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., id. at 70 (observing that throughout American history presidents have
appointed federal judges, particularly Justices, based on various political factors, including
"achieving regional balance or rewarding party loyalty or punishing executive branch policies
or finding a spot for a crony"); id. at 168 (recognizing that a president only has "scarce
political capital" to expend on defending embattled nominees and, thus, might often allow a
nomination to languish or be withdrawn for the sake of saving his "energies for other
battles"); id. at 68 (conceding that "political considerations have entered into judicial
appointments since the start, and sometimes, even in the early years of the Republic, the
politics were about the nominee's likely votes").
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system of government worthwhile, including such principles as equal jus-
tice, freedom, public accountability, and individual responsibility. His dis-
cussion also ignores the constitutional structure of the process, which ties
nominations and confirmations to politics, for better or worse. In particu-
lar, the federal appointments process authorizes the President and the
Senate to check each other's judgments. Additionally, Carter does not
acknowledge the more practical realities of how presidents and senators
are themselves elected and reelected. For example, he never explores the
implications for the confirmation process posed by the passage of the
Seventeenth Amendment, which altered the process by which Senators are
selected from one where they were chosen by state legislatures to one of
popular election.59
Carter fails to appreciate that the larger political context in which
confirmation battles occur provides plausible explanations for many Sen-
ate confirmation actions. For instance, most of the twenty-nine Supreme
Court nominations that have failed did so because of political factors,
including presidential unpopularity.6" The most extreme example of this
trend is the Senate's rejection of five of President Tyler's six nominees for
two Supreme Court seats because the Whig majority in the Senate viewed
him as a weak president destined to serve one-term, doubted his loyalty to
the Whigs, and preferred to save at least one of the appointments for the
Whig-Henry Clay-whom they wanted to be the next president.6"
This dynamic persists today. Carter suggests that the Senate's unani-
mous consent to Justice Scalia's confirmation reflected the absence of a
"modern-day litmus test" for judicial appointments62 and indicated the
then-existing ability of the President "to seek a nominee respected on all
sides, able to garner votes even from those who disagree sharply on
philosophy ... 63 This is reyisionist history. In fact, political factors do
explain Justice Scalia's unanimous confirmation: he was nominated by a
popular Republican president at a time when the Republicans controlled
the Senate; he was nominated to fill the seat that would be vacated if
William Rehnquist's concurrent nomination to the position of Chief Jus-
tice succeeded, and Scalia's likely opponents had to spend their limited
political capital fighting Rehnquist's nomination, which they had figured
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
60. Calvin R. Massey, Getting There: A Brief History of the Politics of Supreme Court
Appointments, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 1 (1991) (observing that "[t]welve of the 29 failed
nominations were rejected outright by the Senate" and the remaining seventeen "either
withdrew or their nominations were postponed by Senate parliamentary maneuvers until a
new President assumed office").
61. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINT-
MENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 106-07 (3d ed. 1992).
62. CARTER, supra note 2, at 79.
63. Id. at 197.
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was easier to defeat than Scalia's; 64 Scalia made himself a small target in
his confirmation hearing by saying as little as possible about his ideology;
65
and he was the first Italian-American ever to be nominated to the Court
and thus enjoyed a status no senator was eager to threaten.66
Carter's blindness towards the politics of the confirmation process is
further reflected in his failure to consider the costs associated with consul-
tation between the President and the Senate. 67 First, consultation can
consume an inordinate amount of time that arguably could make a presi-
dent look weak or indecisive. For example, President Clinton might have
paid such a price when his consultations with key senators (and other
people) led him to take eighty-seven days-"a modern record"-to nomi-
nate Justice Ginsburg68 and over five weeks to nominate Justice Breyer,
who had already been vetted as a finalist for the seat to which Justice
Ginsburg was nominated one year earlier.69 Second, consultation between
the President and the Senate has the potential to hurt the reputations of
potential nominees. This was true in President Clinton's two prolonged
searches for Supreme Court nominees, each of which was riddled with
leaks of the names of possible candidates. These rumors made it easy to
thwart potential nominees merely through threats of opposition and humili-
ated such individuals by exposing their vulnerabilities without giving them
64. Carter describes the heated debate in the Senate over Rehnquist's nomination as
Chief Justice, which succeeded only after he received (prior to Justice Thomas' confirma-
tion) "the greatest number of negative votes ever cast against a candidate who actually won
confirmation." Id. at 79. Carter fails, however, to explore the implications of this close
confirmation for Justice Scalia's confirmation.
65. Justice Scalia's confirmation performance supports Carter's claim that "the Senate
has never rejected a nominee for failing to answer its questions." Id. at 59.
66. See ABRAHAM, supra note 61, at 351-53.
67. Carter's attitude about consultation is unclear. At one point, he refuses to endorse the
practice. Id. at 13 (suggesting that in the nineteenth century the President and the Senate
"would do their horse trading in advance, and the resulting nominees would all be easily
confirmed.... [This practice] was not necessarily better than what we have now; it was
simply different."). Yet, he complains that after the Hayes administration "the legislative
branch lost a good deal of its influence over the appointments process, becoming more like
what it is today: a body that reacts to the President's nominees rather than one that is
consulted in advance." Id. at 35.
68. Conor O'Clery, Nomination Adds to Image of Disarray, IR. TIMES, June 16, 1993, at 8.
69. See Kathy Lewis, Politics, Health Weeded Out Two Court Hopefuls, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, May 15, 1994, at 1A (describing Clinton's many meetings with advisors that delayed
his decision to nominate Justice Breyer). The delay in nominating Justice Breyer is all the
more perplexing because the President had notice as early as January 1994 of Justice
Blackmun's intention to announce his retirement later in the year. See Ruth Marcus, Dole
Backs Mitchell for High Court, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1994, at A5 (describing frustration
within administration over White House's failure to take advantage of advance notice of
Blackmun's retirement). The most likely answer for the delay is that the White House was
not prepared with a second choice once its first choice, Senate Majority Leader George
Mitchell, withdrew from consideration after meeting with the President to discuss the
nomination.
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a chance to defend themselves publicly.7" Third, consultation can force a
president to pick a nominee who is not his first choice. For instance,
President Clinton has stated a preference to nominate a Justice with
substantial "public experience., 71 The problem is that such candidates are
the likeliest to have political enemies and thus the most vulnerable to
attack in a public search process.
Carter's failure to explore adequately the political dynamics of the
confirmation process also causes him to miss the ability of the system to
correct its own errors. For example, Carter praises President Clinton's
narrowing of his choice to replace Justice White to Ruth Bader Ginsburg
or Stephen Breyer as a change from Presidents Reagan's and Bush's
practice of acceding to "the pressure to select someone who could be
counted on more reliably to vote into constitutional law his party's plat-
form .... Yet, Carter fails to note that this change came about as the
result of a presidential election-the appropriate correction mechanism in
the political system-in which candidate Clinton had expressed (and pre-
sumably received approval of) his agenda for Supreme Court appoint-
ments.73
2. Positive Contributions of the Senate, the Public, and the Media
In addition to ignoring the politics behind the confirmation process,
Carter also fails to point to any positive contributions made to the confirma-
tion process by the Senate, the media, or the public. He also neglects to
define the roles he would prefer to see the public and the media perform
70. See Howard Kurtz, Reporters Feast on Leaks, Then Bite the Hand that Feeds Them,
WASH. POST, June 19, 1993, at B1, B5 (describing media's eagerness to speculate about
potential Supreme Court nominees).
71. Leo Rennert, Nominee Emerged after Two Other Candidates Fell from Race, SACRA-
MENTO BEE, June 15, 1993, at A12.
72. CARTER, supra note 2, at 188; see also id. at 96 (praising the nomination of Justice
Ginsburg "who had nothing going for her but the fact that she is a brilliant jurist whom
everybody respects"). Similarly, in the midst of a speaking tour on behalf of his book,
Professor Carter praised President Clinton's nomination of Justice Breyer for "calling a
stop" to the practices of Presidents Reagan and Bush "to screen nominees for their votes."
Marcia Coyle, Carter on Breyer: Three Views, NAT'L L.J., June 6, 1994, at A22.
73. See CARTER, supra note 2, at 56 (describing candidate Clinton's promise to appoint
only Justices who believed in the right to privacy). Moreover, Carter's failure to explore the
sophisticated political aspects of the confirmation process precludes him from asking an
especially troublesome question about the recent confirmation process: why was it that
President Clinton, within the first eighteen months of his term, has had over half a dozen
troubled nominations even though his own political party controlled the Senate during that
same period? The answer, ignored by Carter, is that many of the pivotal votes cast in
proceedings then were from Southern Democrats, who tend to be less liberal than their
northeastern colleagues, particularly with respect to such issues as affirmative action, abor-
tion, and crime. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Gender, Race, and the Politics of Supreme Court
Appointments: The Import of the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas Hearings: October Tragedy, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1497, 1498-99 (1992) (explaining how Southern Democrats accounted for
Senate's rejection of Robert Bork and confirmation of Clarence Thomas).
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in the confirmation process, much less any standard by which to measure
either's performance.
For instance, instead of praising the Senate for confirming Roberta
Achtenberg as an Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
regardless of her homosexuality, he laments that complaints about her
sexuality "say[] something unhappy about our society[, i.e.,] we still cherish
our discriminatory impulses against people who are different, and we often
do it by calling difference a moral issue.",74 Moreover, Carter notes that
Janet Reno's confirmation hearings were marred by "scurrilous rumors of
[her] drunken driving ... [that] turned out to be false .... , Yet, given
the outcome of these hearings, someone obviously did something right, but
Carter does not say who or what should receive the credit.
With respect to the public's involvement in the confirmation process,
Carter refers to "our uncertainty as a polity about how to exercise the
power of self-governance, which is why we so often behave as common-
wealth subjects, waiting for government to make things better, rather than
as American citizens whose task is to go out and run things.",76 Given
Carter's resistance to public pressure to confirm Justices based on their
ideologies, a reasonable inference is that he expects the public to adopt a
larger role in keeping the President and the Senate focused on a nomi-
nees' credentials and in preventing senators from punishing nominees for
their innocuous sins. Yet, the problem with these expectations (other than
Carter's failure to spell them out) is that he never suggests nor explores
what a reasonable expectation would be regarding the public's ability to
become involved in the details of a confirmation dispute.77
Moreover, although Carter does not give the public or the media credit
for positively influencing the confirmation process, each has done so. For
instance, much of the opposition to Zoe Baird's nomination came from the
middle class, which resented her inability to comply with the law even
though she had the financial means to provide her hired help with all of
the mandated benefits and thus avoid breaching the Social Security laws.78
74. CARTER, supra note 2, at 171.
75. Id. at 8.
76. Id. at 15.
77. For example, it is reasonable to expect the public to ensure that the President and the
Senate each try to be as honest as possible in, and to do their respective homework prior to,
making public statements about a nominee. Hence, it is the public's duty to keep the
President's feet to the fire to ensure that he make informed judgments about policy and
nominations, but it is not the public's fault that President Clinton failed to read Lani
Guinier's writings prior to nominating her and thus later had to admit that this failure
accounts for his mistake in nominating her. See id. at 9.
78. See Baird is Ko'd By the Punch of Populism, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 24, 1993, at 2C
(suggesting Baird's nomination was destroyed by populist sentiment that people with less
money could not get away with breaking the same law); The Baird Nomination, WASH. POST,
Jan. 24, 1993, at C6 (maintaining that average Americans who are forced to comply with
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President Clinton's withdrawal of Baird's nomination was partly motivated
by his recognition of the key role played by the middle class in his election
and the necessity of retaining that group's support for the sake of reelec-
tion and the success of his legislative agenda.
Another example of such contributions occurred during the second
phase of Justice Thomas' confirmation hearings, which were not planned
until the media discovered that the Senate Judiciary Committee had failed
to schedule a hearing when it first learned of Anita Hill's charges against
Thomas. 79 The public immediately responded with calls, faxes, and tele-
grams to the Judiciary Committee that led it (and the nominee and his
sponsor, Senator Jack Danforth) in less than a day to agree to a public
hearing on Hill's charges. Despite Carter's expression of agreement with
the Committee's scheduling of the hearing, 80 he fails to appreciate the
public's and media's responsibility for arranging that proceeding.
III. THE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS WITH CARTER'S MAJOR THEMES
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS' FOCUS ON
DISQUALIFYING FACTORS
This section examines the difficulties with Carter's claims about the two
principal sources of the confirmation process' focus on disqualifying fac-
tors. The first source is the presumption of confirmation. The second is the
American public, which Carter condemns for its intolerance of sin and
corresponding penchant for punishment, as well as for its view of govern-
ment service as a reward rather than a calling.
1. The Presumption of Confirmation
The most serious problem with Carter's charge that a presumption of
confirmation has produced an undue emphasis on disqualifying factors is
that this presumption is part of the constitutional structure. Carter admits
the Framers' assumption that the Senate would be likelier than the House
of Representatives to "reflect on the fundamental values of the nation."81
However, he does not acknowledge the Framers' related belief that in the
context of confirmations, the Senate should therefore reject nominees for
publicly compelling reasons.82 The Framers understood that because the
government regulations had little sympathy for the plight of two wealthy lawyers who
ignored these rules).
79. See Susan Page, Thomas Case Subpoenas; Senate Wants to Question Reporters on Leaks,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 4, 1992, at 15. To be sure, the media has made mistakes (as it obviously did
in reporting Robert Bork's private video rentals). CARTER, supra note 2, at 138. That,
however, is the price we pay for the First Amendment.
80. CARTER, supra note 2, at 138.
81. Id. at 152.
82. See THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 457 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); id. No. 77, at 461 (Alexander Hamilton); Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitu-
tion of the United States, § 791 (John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda eds., 1987); see also
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Appointment Clause fixes the power to nominate in a single person who
has a mandate of national scope and includes within that power the ability
to make successive nominations, it gives a substantial political advantage
to the President over a diffuse legislative body like the Senate in disagree-
ments over appointments. Because of this institutional balance of power,
the Senate, regardless of which party controls it, is generally forced to cut
through the chaos of a confirmation to find compelling reasons for rejec-
tion.83
Given Carter's acceptance of the basic structure for confirmations, he is
stuck with the presumption that nominees will be confirmed. Furthermore,
the President and the Senate each have reasons to prefer that the system
remain as it is presently structured. As Carter recognizes, it is not possible
for the Senate to closely inspect each person nominated to a confirmable
position, because "[tlhere is far more for Congress to oversee, and far less
time for the Senate to give all nominees [numbering over a thousand] the
scrutiny that their positions deserve." 84 In other words, the presumption
helps to ensure that the administration of the federal government will not
become bogged down in confirmation squabbles.85
Carter's own historiography supports this conclusion. Even though he
suggests that the presumption of confirmation initially took hold for cabi-
net appointments during the Hayes administration, he observes that the
dominant practice prior to this period was for "[t]he leading members of
Congress and the President [to] negotiate[] the cabinet before anybody
was nominated. One result of this system is that only four cabinet nomi-
nees were apparently withdrawn in the entire nineteenth century., 86 This
statement implies that a presumption of confirmation was at work prior to
John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process: A
Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 636, 651-56 (1993) (arguing
that Framers' intent allows for Senate rejection of nominees only for "special reasons"
rather than reasons of partisanship or likely votes on particular issues).
83. No doubt, Carter would respond that the confirmation process is a mess partly
because the Senate will either find or make up those compelling reasons as it sees fit. Yet,
even if it were true that the debate in a confirmation hearing is not always as focused or as
elevated as a Yale Law School seminar, this argument misses the point because it is the
structure of the Constitution that gives rise to the initial focus on disqualifying factors. The
Appointments Clause itself puts a "political burden on the Senate [that] makes it difficult
[for the Senate] to successfully oppose a President of ordinary political strength for narrow
or partisan reasons .... McGinnis, supra note 82, at 653.
84. CARTER, supra note 2, at 36.
85. Carter also suggests that the President and the Senate could agree on legislation
setting forth the qualifications for confirmable positions. CARTER, supra note 2, at 166. The
President and the Senate have never done so because each prefers to retain discretion to fill
positions or oppose nominations as their respective political needs dictate. They also both
recognize that such legislation is useless because it would have to be phrased in such
amorphous language as to be of no real significance; moreover, both the President and the
Senate probably realize that the political capital expended on such an enterprise would be
better spent on a case by case basis as each side sees fit.
86. Id. at 35.
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the Hayes administration. Given that few cabinet nominations have failed
both before and after the Hayes administration, it is clear that the presump-
tion of confirmation has been in effect all along and that only the political
incentives for consultation have changed.
Additionally, even though Carter proposes "that we should balance
what good the candidate might do when serving in the position against the
evil that the putatively 'disqualifying' factor represents,"87 the presump-
tion of confirmation already allows for a complex balancing of these and
other factors, including the President's popularity, the nominee's profes-
sional distinction, and the relationship of the misconduct to the responsibili-
ties the nominee is asking to exercise. Although Carter would prefer to
restrict the scope of balancing in confirmation proceedings, such narrow-
ing is neither constitutionally mandated nor sufficiently sensitive to the
flexibility the President and the Senate each need in order to maneuver
through the confirmation process and the business of operating the federal
government.
In practice, this means that when a nomination comes before the rel-
evant Senate committee, regardless of the office involved, it rarely fails for
just one reason.88 Instead, the process always entails a balancing of mul-
tiple criteria. For example, Carter notes that President Clinton's nominee
for Associate Attorney General, Webster Hubbell, secured confirmation
only after having apologized for having been a member of a racially
exclusive country club.89 Yet, the Senate confirmed Hubbell because he
presented no other apparent negatives, calculating that his problematic
membership could be cured by an apology and by indicia that he had tried
to change the club's discriminatory policy. Whatever damage remained,
87. Id. at 177-78.
88. A single disqualifying factor is likelier to undo someone's chances to get nominated in
the first place. Once a nomination has been made, the presumption of confirmation provides
a structural, public impediment to the nomination's undoing; only one person-the Presi-
dent-has to be convinced to make or not make a nomination, however, and even then could
decide for any reason he deems appropriate to go with a different candidate. For example,
after Zoe Baird's forced withdrawal, President Clinton had narrowed his choice for Attorney
General to Judge Kimba Wood. See Richard Benedetto, Fallout Continues In and Out of
White House: Wood, Baird Cases Different, Most Say, USA TODAY, Feb. 9, 1993, at 4A (stating
that most Americans did not think Clinton should have withdrawn Wood's name). At the last
minute, though, he did not nominate her. Her problem was that she had lost the President's
confidence when she failed to give a frank answer to an inquiry into whether she had a Zoe
Baird problem. Judge Wood answered the question "no." Even though she, unlike Baird,
had legally hired an illegal alien, the President and his advisers felt that the Wood
nomination should not be made because they figured the public was opposed to Baird's
nomination in part because she had hired an illegal alien at a time when the influx of illegal
aliens into the country was a problem and because the administration thought Judge Wood
either should have had sufficient political acumen to know this or should have been open
with White House personnel so that they could assess the political ramifications of her
nomination. See Carter, supra note 2, at 207 n.3.
89. Id. at 43-44.
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the Senate concluded, could be offset by several other factors, including
his close personal friendship with the President (signalling to the Senate
that the President would be more disposed to defend this nominee than
the garden variety sub-cabinet nominee), and his distinguished past public
service. 9°
Carter also fails to discuss how the presumption of confirmation helped
to reinforce the positive records and secure the appointment of two other
Clinton nominees, despite their potentially disqualifying behavior. 91 The
Senate confirmed Walter Dellinger as Assistant Attorney General for the
Office of Legal Counsel because his distinguished record as a constitu-
tional law scholar, consultant (sometimes with the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee responsible for forwarding his nomination), and advocate offset the
damage caused by both his incomplete payment of Social Security taxes for
domestic help and an attempted filibuster by his home state senators from
North Carolina.92 Concern also arose about Eleanor Acheson's nomina-
tion to Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Policy because
of her failure to pay Social Security taxes on domestic help and her
membership in a racially exclusive club. The presumption of confirmation,
however, gave her sufficient opportunity to convince the Senate to confirm
90. Prior to his nomination as Associate Attorney General, Hubbell had served as Mayor
of Little Rock, Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court, and managing partner of one
of Little Rock's most distinguished law firms. W. John Moore, At Justice, A Big Chair Needs
Filling, NAT'L J., Mar. 19, 1994, at 663. The problem with Hubbell's appointment did not
arise until later. In December 1994, nine months after resigning his Justice Department post,
Hubbell pled guilty to felony charges of mail fraud and income tax evasion in defrauding his
old law firm and its clients of $394,000 and of evading more than $120,000 in federal income
taxes. See Mark Hosenball & Michael Isikoff, A Clinton Ally Falls Prey to Whitewater,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 12, 1994, at 37. At least one major issue raised by Hubbell's resignation
and subsequent guilty plea is whether the initial background check conducted by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for his appointment as Associate Attorney General disclosed or gave
any hints as to impending trouble. Although there is no indication whatsoever that anyone
involved in Hubbell's appointment had any inkling of the legal difficulties he would later
have, one issue ignored for the most part in the literature on confirmation is how often
potentially disqualifying information about a nominee is kept hidden successfully by the
President, the Senate, or anyone working on behalf of one or another for the purpose of
securing confirmation. To the extent that this is a problem at all in the confirmation process,
it reflects on the integrity of the decisionmakers involved and on their paternalistic attitudes
with respect to the general public.
91. In contrast, in discussing two other failed nominations, Carter implicitly recognizes
the balancing involved. For example, Theodore Sorenson withdrew his nomination by
President Carter to head the Central Intelligence Agency because, as Carter explains, "of
assertions that he lacked experience, was a pacifist, and had used secret documents in
writing about the Kennedy administration." CARTER, supra note 2, at 8. In addition, the
Senate rejected President Washington's nomination of then-Associate Justice John Rutledge
to become Chief Justice because of the nominee's opposition to the Jay Treaty and doubts
about his sanity. See id. at 16, 69; see also McGinnis, supra note 82, at 654 (arguing that issue
of insanity rather than political views on the Jay Treaty resulted in the rejection of
Rutledge's nomination).
92. See Ellen Silberman, Dellinger Wins Confirmation Despite Helms and Faircloth Objec-
tions, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1993, at 1.
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her, based on her long history of pro bono work on civil rights issues and
indicia that she joined the club in an effort to diversify it.93
In contrast, some negatives simply overwhelm the presumption of confir-
mation and a nominee's positive record. For example, Gerald Torres was
forced to withdraw his nomination as Assistant Attorney General for the
Lands Division, despite his strong record of public service and academic
scholarship, because of concerns about an ongoing criminal investigation
(in which he was not implicated) of a law firm to which he once belonged
and because of his writings about racial justice, including environmental
racism-a subject plainly relevant to the post to which he was nominated.94
Even more dramatically, Justice Fortas withdrew his nomination as Chief
Justice because of four negatives: President Johnson's popularity was low
at the time he made the nomination; Fortas' nomination was viewed as an
act of cronyism rather than a merit appointment; Fortas' association with
the controversial liberal activism of the Warren Court cost him valuable
political support; and Fortas' acceptance of a substantial fee for conduct-
ing a university seminar while he was serving as a Supreme Court Justice
reflected badly on his professional judgment and was viewed by many as an
ethical breach.95 Similarly, the Senate rejected Robert Bork's nomination
as an Associate Justice because, as Carter concedes, Bork "had much to
answer for,"9 6 including his opposition to desegregation, his firing of
Special Watergate Prosecutor Archibald Cox, his claim that precedents
not grounded in original intent, such as Brown, lacked "legitimacy," 97 and
93. See Michael Wines, Justice Nominee Defended for Joining Exclusive Club, N.Y. TIMES,
July 3, 1993, § 1, at 7 (describing club's policies and Acheson's efforts to change them); Ana
Puga, Boston Lawyer, Named to US Post, Faces Flap over Club, BOSTON GLOBE, June 17,
1993, at 3 (describing support for Acheson based on her commitment to civil rights).
94. See Jennifer Corbett, Concern Over Writings of Nominee Is Reported, STAR TRIB., July
7, 1993, at A4.
95. See CARTER, supra note 2, at 176 (discussing Justice Fortas' ethical breaches, which
stalled his nomination as Chief Justice); see also ABRAHAM, supra note 61, at 14-15, 287. The
perception of Fortas' nomination as cronyism was reinforced by Johnson's nomination of his
old friend, Judge Homer Thornberry, to the Supreme Court vacancy that would arise once
Fortas was confirmed as Chief Justice. In fact, the double nomination of Fortas and
Thornberry could be itself viewed as yet another contributing factor to Fortas' forced
withdrawal. Although the double nomination could have been viewed simply as expedient, it
could have been perceived as an indication of President Johnson's overconfidence, which
could have constituted yet another red flag to his political enemies.
96. CARTER, supra note 2, at 48.
97. Id. at 48 (quoting GARY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 262
(1990) (quoting from then-Judge Bork's speech before the Federalist Society)). In contrast,
Justice Breyer's failure to pay Social Security taxes on his domestic help and his rulings in
eight cases involving environmental cleanup costs that could conceivably have helped his
investments with Lloyd's of London did not lead the Senate to reject his nomination. His
distinguished record as a Harvard Law professor, administrative law scholar, chief counsel to
the Senate Judiciary Committee, and his status as a federal appellate judge clearly weighed
in favor of his appointment. The major exception to this trend of balancing, therefore,
involves egregious misconduct. For example, the Senate rejected one of its own members,
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his inconsistent testimony before the Senate. 98
2. Public Attitudes as a Source of the Confirmation Process' Focus on
Disqualifying Factors
Carter's complaints about public opinion regarding sin and the nature of
government service are misplaced for four reasons. First, he fails to pro-
vide any empirical support for the public attitudes to which he refers. He
also does not substantiate the link between these attitudes and actual
confirmation results.
Second, the American public is too diverse to have a single attitude
about the confirmation process, government service, or religious ideas such
as sin and redemption. This diversity of opinion extends to the appropriate
reasons for entering into government service: it is unlikely that the Ameri-
can public could agree on which is the most preferred or the likeliest
reason for doing so. Moreover, given our religious diversity, we are un-
likely to reach a consensus about the propriety of viewing the confirmation
process in Christian theological terms or treating the Senate as a forum in
which public figures could seek redemption.99
Third, even if Carter were right that there is a dominant attitude about
government service, the confirmation process, forgiveness, punishment, or
sin, it is not likely to be along the lines he supposes. For example, the
American people might not be disposed to punish too much or be reluc-
tant to forgive. Instead, they might prefer that the Senate examine the
degree to which a nominee's sin is linked to the position for which she
seeks confirmation. Hence, it is possible that the American people forgave
Zoe Baird for having failed to pay Social Security taxes on her domestic
help, but felt that her violation deprived her of the necessary moral
authority for demanding that a citizen obey a law that she thinks is silly or
wrong. Similarly, many Americans might have forgiven Judge Douglas
John Tower, as President Bush's first choice for Secretary of Defense because his notorious
womanizing and drinking demeaned the office. See CARTER, supra note 2, at 8.
98. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1386-91 (1990)
(explaining how Bork's abandonment of his prior positions undermined Senate's confidence
in his credibility).
99. Nor are we as bloodthirsty as Carter imagines. See CARTER, supra note 2, at 11. If we
were, it would be difficult to explain a Los Angeles jury's dividing over but being disposed
not to convict the Menendez brothers for killing their parents, a Virginia jury's decision to
acquit Lorena Bobbitt for cutting off her husband's penis with criminal intent, the willing-
ness of a majority of the American people to forgive President Clinton's marital infidelities,
or even the November 1994 re-election of Marion Barry as the Mayor of the District of
Columbia in spite of his imprisonment based on felony convictions. Moreover, this bloodthirsti-
ness would not explain the Senate's overwhelming confirmation of Janet Reno as Attorney
General in spite of her opposition to the death penalty. See Martin Dyckman, Janet
Reno/Justice For All, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 4, 1993, at D1 (remarking on Reno's
popularity with Congress and the public, despite her firm opposition to the death penalty).
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Ginsburg for smoking marijuana as an adult, but his Republican support-
ers, who wanted a tough law and order Justice, were not so forgiving.
Lastly, even if Carter were correct that the public has the kinds of
attitudes to which he has attributed it, such views are not necessarily
misguided. This is especially true for the perception of government service
as a reward. For one thing, this attitude is consistent with the reality of
successful presidential politics. Presidents have rarely won office and even
more rarely stayed in office without relying on people whose judgment they
(or other influential team members) have come to trust through prior
service together. A president needs to depend on the loyalty of his key
aides or cabinet officers to implement his perceived mandate.
Perhaps more importantly, Carter's view of government service is flawed
in two other respects. First, it rests on the mistaken premise that reward-
ing people with government jobs somehow means that unqualified people
will end up serving in important government posts. However, loyalty, prior
government or public service with distinction, and political experience and
acumen qualify and justify treating nominations as rewards.'1° Second,
Carter overstates the problem. More often than Carter admits, the current
system checks rewarding people with government jobs indiscriminately.
For instance, public scrutiny and congressional oversight have caused
many of the Arkansans who came to Washington as President Clinton's
friends in high-profile positions to leave the latter posts under a cloud of
controversy or because of dissatisfaction with their performance.' 0 '
100. Carter also never clarifies what he means by a "calling." If by that term he refers to
someone with impeccable credentials who leaves a lucrative job to take lesser pay to work on
behalf of the public good, he ignores that countless individuals have done just that during
the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations. Alternatively, a "calling" might refer to
altogether foregoing work in the private sector for the sake of spending the better part of
one's professional life working for the government or public interest organizations or
both-a description that also fits numerous individuals from the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton
administrations.
101. President Clinton brought more than 175 friends from Arkansas to join his administra-
tion. While the vast majority of these discharged their official responsibilities with great skill
and professionalism and without any hint of scandal, many of the Arkansans closest to him
in the administration (or as least most closely identified with him) have been less successful.
These latter Arkansans include Joycelyn Elders (fired from her post as Surgeon General);
Webb Hubbell (resigned from his post as Associate Attorney General amid rumors-later
confirmed by his guilty plea-that he had defrauded his former law partners and some of his
former firm's clients); William Kennedy III (eventually resigned from the White House
Counsel's Office after having been demoted from the number three position in it subsequent
to his disclosure that he had failed to pay Social Security taxes for a family nanny); Thomas
F. "Mac" McLarty (demoted to presidential adviser from his initial position as presidential
Chief of Staff); and David Watkins (fired as White House aide for taking a presidential
helicopter on golf outing). See Timothy J. McNulty, Spotlight Has Been Hard on Little Rock;
The Joy in Clinton's Victory A Dim Memory, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 3, 1995, at 1.
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B. CARTER'S ATTITUDES ABOUT SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION
PROCEEDINGS
1. The Threat to Judicial Independence Posed by Examining a Judicial
Nominee's Ideology
Carter's argument that questioning judicial nominees about their ideolo-
gies poses a threat to judicial independence is problematic for five reasons.
These reasons all relate to Carter's failure to recognize that the Constitu-
tion strikes a balance between the accountability and independence of the
judiciary.
First, the Constitution does not protect judicial independence in the
manner (or even to the extent) Carter imagines. In fact, just the opposite is
true. The Constitution limits judicial independence in critical ways-for
instance, by empowering two elected branches of the federal government
(the President and the Senate) to make the determinative judgments on
judicial composition. Participation by the President and the Senate in
judicial confirmation serve as effective majoritarian checks on the counter-
majoritarian function performed by the judiciary. Once a Justice is con-
firmed, he or she is immune from political reprisals except for impeachment,
but the one time that the Constitution requires that a judicial nominee to
account to the political branches for how he or she has performed or
intends to perform as a judge is the confirmation process.
Second, Carter's lack of appreciation for the degree to which the consti-
tutional structure contemplates the politicization of Supreme Court nomi-
nations is especially apparent in his failure to acknowledge that presidents
and senators have been concerned about the political ramifications of
Supreme Court nominations from the Republic's inception. °2 Supreme
Court confirmations have invariably turned on political factors, including a
judicial nominee's political views as a proxy for how he or she would
perform as a Justice; °3 and every president has made Supreme Court
102. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 61, at 5.
103. A sampling of the effect of political views on a nomination includes John Rutledge
(rejected in part for opposing the Jay Treaty), Alexander Wolcott (rejected for vigorously
enforcing the Embargo and Nonintercourse Acts as the federal customs collector for
Connecticut), George Woodward (rejected for supporting restricted immigration and discrimi-
nation against new ethnic groups), Ebenezer Hoar (rejected for opposing political patronage
and Andrew Johnson's impeachment), Nathan Clifford (barely confirmed after bitter debate
over his support for slavery), Caleb Cushing (rejected for shifting political allegiances too
often throughout his lifetime), Louis Brandeis (confirmed but only after being attacked for
being too liberal), John Parker (rejected for uttering some racist sentiments as a gubernato-
rial candidate in North Carolina), Clement Haynesworth (rejected for antiunionist and
alleged racist insensitivity), Harold Carswell (rejected in part for racist statements and
activities), Abe Fortas (rejected in part for being closely linked to the troubled presidency of
Lyndon Johnson), and Robert Bork (rejected in part for opposing the 1964 Civil Rights Act
and for firing the first Special Watergate Prosecutor). See Massey, supra note 60, at 5-7; see
also Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A Commentary on the Nomination and Confirmation
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nominations with certain criteria in mind. t °4 In this century, a period
coinciding roughly with the practice of having a Supreme Court nominee
testify, the concern has focused more openly but never solely on a judicial
nominee's ideology. Hence, since 1925, most presidents have campaigned
on the kinds of judicial appointments they would make 0 5 and sought
information about a likely nominee's approach to constitutional issues in
the hopes of covering specific areas of concern to the President (and his
advisers) and other issues likely to arise in the future. °6 During this time,
three nominees have been rejected in significant part because of their
judicial ideologies,1"7 and many other nominees have been confirmed only
after close scrutiny of their ideologies.10 8
Third, Carter's argument that the confirmation process poses a threat to
judicial independence rests on the mistaken premise that confirmation
hearings operate much as popular judicial elections do.109 Carter, how-
of Justice Thomas, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 969, 975-76 (1992) (arguing that politically-
motivated nominations have led to both distinguished and mediocre Justices).
104. For example, President Washington picked Justices based on their "(1) support and
advocacy of the Constitution; (2) distinguished service in the Revolution; (3) active participa-
tion in the political life of state or nation; (4) prior judicial experience on lower tribunals;
(5) either a 'favorable reputation with his fellows' or personal ties with Washington himself;
(6) geographic suitability; (7) love of our country." ABRAHAM, supra note 61, at 72-73. Each
of the next five presidents primarily chose Supreme Court nominees on the basis of their
party loyalty, public service, and geographic suitability. See id. at 80 (Adams); 84-87 (Jeffer-
son); 88-91 (Madison); 91-92 (Monroe); and 93-94 (John Quincy Adams). President Jackson
primarily emphasized party loyalty. See id. at 95-103. Whereas President Polk considered
party loyalty, geographic suitability, and ideological compatibility, id. at 107-10, President
Fillmore emphasized a nominee's anti-slavery views, political experience, and character, id.
at 110-12. President Lincoln focused on picking nominees who would be a "partner in the
nation's preservation." Id. at 116. Presidents Cleveland, Harrison, and McKinley each
emphasized economic conservatism in picking their respective Supreme Court nominees. See
id. at 140-47 (Cleveland), 147-52 (Harrison), 152-55 (McKinley); see also infra note 107 and
accompanying text.
105. Presidents Franklin Roosevelt, Nixon, Reagan, and Bush each pledged to make
certain kinds of judicial appointments. See ABRAHAM, supra note 61, at 212 (Roosevelt), 298
(Nixon), 337 (Reagan), 365 (Bush); LAURENCE TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT:
How THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY 71 (Nixon), 134
(Roosevelt), 77 (Reagan) (1985); see also CARTER, supra note 2, at 56, 69-71 (describing
Presidents Reagan's, Bush's, and Clinton's campaign pledges regarding Supreme Court
appointments).
106. This process describes the criteria for the Reagan and Bush administrations' nomina-
tions of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and
Thomas. See ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE SELECTION OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES 4-9 (remarks of former Solicitor General Kenneth Starr), 41-44, 46 (remarks of former
Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds) (A. Darby Dickinson ed., 1993).
107. Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology, Judicial Selection, and Judicial Ethics, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 643, 646-53 (1989) (discussing the rejections of Supreme Court nominees John
Parker, Clement Haynesworth, and Robert Bork).
108. Supreme Court nominees confirmed after close scrutiny of their judicial ideologies
include Justices Brandeis, Marshall, Rehnquist, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. See Ger-
hardt, supra note 103, at 973-76.
109. CARTER, supra note 2, at 98-99.
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ever, fails to point to a single instance in which the public directed the
outcome of a confirmation hearing or, for that matter, a nomination of any
sort." 0 Nor does he show how, if at all, the public has influenced nomina-
tions. Moreover, the consequence of a Senate rejection, as Carter himself
describes it, is the same as a public referendum: one nominee is rejected,
but the President may choose another."' In contrast, a popular election
allows citizens to choose the person they prefer most from among the
available candidates. A referendum or confirmation proceeding allows the
decisionmakers to decide only if they will accept the nominee. In other
words, in a confirmation proceeding the Senate decides whether a Su-
preme Court nominee is acceptable, not whether the nominee is the top
choice of most senators for the Court. Thus, the public's and even the
Senate's powers to shape Supreme Court appointments are limited.
Fourth, questioning judicial nominees about their ideologies is unlikely
to enable either the President or the Senate to shape and control the
judiciary to the extent Carter implies. As Carter observes, the nominee can
say something that will be sufficiently pleasing to the President to get the
nomination or to the Senate to get confirmed, but then do on the Court
whatever he or she wishes." 2 This risk has often led presidents and
senators to seek insights into a judicial nominee's ideology from other
reliable sources, such as his or her political or public service activities."'
To be sure, the critical question is to what extent the extended inquiry into
past judicial performance by the President or the Senate has encouraged
ambitious judges to cast votes that might please people who have the
power to elevate them. Even though it is conceivable that some judges do
decide cases with their own future prospects in mind, Carter does not
explore this prospect, which seems potentially endemic to any appoint-
ment system, regardless of the people or institutions authorized to make
appointments.
Lastly, no nominee has ever made a promise, at least to the Senate,
about how he or she will vote in a case likely to come before the Court.
Carter himself points out that the Senate has never rejected anyone for
110. Indeed, the Senate has only twice directed the President to choose a specific
individual to fill a Supreme Court vacancy: Ulysses Grant, who a large majority of Congress
persuaded to nominate Edwin Stanton (who died four days after his confirmation) in
exchange for the appointment of Grant's Attorney General, Ebenezer Hoar, to the Court;
and Herbert Hoover, whose political unpopularity enabled leading senators to strong-arm
him into nominating Benjamin Cardozo. See Massey, supra note 60, at 11-12.
111. CARTER, supra note 2, at 202-03.
112. Id. at 58-59.
113. See supra note 105 and accompanying text; cf. Michael J. Gerhardt, Models to Learn
From: Good, Bad, and Ugly, LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1992, at 26, 38 (suggesting that one can
"accurately measure judicial excellence, philosophy, and temperament by examining the
level, nature, and kinds of professional accomplishments, public-service and political activi-
ties, sponsors, speeches, and academic writings of a nominee").
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saying too little in a confirmation hearing114 and, thus, the most serious
part of the threat to judicial independence-the coercion of a vote-has
never been realized.
2. The Supreme Court as a National Policymaker
Carter suggests that Supreme Court confirmation hearings have become
increasingly contentious because of the growing popular conception of the
Supreme Court as a national policymaker whose authority as such can be
controlled through the appointments process. Yet this view of the Su-
preme Court is not new, and for this reason the stakes in Supreme Court
confirmation hearings have always been high. For instance, in 1857 the
Senate barely confirmed Nathan Clifford as an Associate Justice after
debating the propriety of his strong pro-slavery views.115 Surely, the Court's
decision a year earlier in Dred Scott v. Sandford11 6 had taught the nation a
lasting lesson about the Court's potential to shape society through rulings
inextricably linked to its ideological composition.
Of course, the Court does not have to be viewed as a "national policy-
maker" in order for people to care deeply about what it does. Every
decision of the Court can be criticized as either making policy of the sort
more properly made by Congress or the states, or as having interfered too
much (or too little) with the policymaking authority of the other branches.
Condemning a decision of the Court as inappropriate policymaking is as
empty as advocating that it is a judge's job to interpret rather than make
the law-no one in her right mind would ever advocate that a judge should
make policy (at least of the sort a legislature makes). The more important
but perhaps unanswerable question is how the Court should undertake this
interpretive enterprise or in what way the Court has taken on an inappropri-
ate policymaking function.
It may be more accurate to suggest that a growing concern exists that the
selection of Supreme Court Justices has become too partisan or even
result-oriented and that not enough attention is paid to a nominee's fitness
to serve on the Court. This is not the same complaint as lamenting that the
Court has become a national policymaker, nor does this concern imply a
desire to move the Court in any particular direction. Instead, it is possible
that many people hope that the most experienced even-tempered lawyers,
judges, and political leaders are chosen for the Court. This desire rests on
the belief that law is not politics in some other guise; that law is a
discipline requiring considerable study, reading, training, and practice if it
is to be performed well." 7 This view encompasses the attitude Carter says
114. CARTER, supra note 2, at 59.
115. TRIBE, supra note 105, at 88.
116. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
117. Although some might argue that this conception of law is an illusion and masks what
judges, lawmakers, and lawyers really do, see, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies:
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we should have about the Court.118 His mistake is that he has mischaracter-
ized the public's discontent with the confirmation process as a focus on
inappropriate judicial policymaking rather than as a concern with choosing
the best-qualified nominees for the Court.119
C. THE PROPRIETY OF FOCUSING ON A JUDICIAL NOMINEE'S MORAL
CHARACTER
There are four problems with Carter's preference for having Supreme
Court confirmation proceedings focus on a justice's moral vision and
character. First, this focus is bound to make such confirmations messier
because it will invite a nominee's opponents to do whatever they can to
taint her reputation. One benefit of focusing on a nominee's ideology is
that it usually turns on some sort of documentation. If the focus were on a
nominee's moral disposition, much of the debate is bound to turn on
perceptions or even on swearing contests between conflicting character
witnesses about private conduct with arguably public implications-
something, say, on the order of the second phase of the Thomas hearings.
Second, no consensus exists on the criteria for selecting Supreme Court
Justices, including whether a nominee's "moral vision and the capacity for
moral reflection"12 are among those ingredients. Few, if any, constitu-
tional scholars agree on the key attributes for a Supreme Court Justice.
Although good moral character might seem essential for someone to
become a Supreme Court Justice, no agreement on what constitutes good
moral character exists, and it is hard to say whether this quality should
An Introduction, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 239, 239-42 (1984), it still may be the popular
perception of the Court.
118. See CARTER, supra note 2, at 124.
119. It is important to understand that the friction in confirmation hearings also reflects
the fundamentally political nature of the Supreme Court. This is true because no one gets to
sit on the Court without being approved for that position by the political branches of the
federal government; to be confirmed, one must at least be political in the sense of knowing
the right people or convincing the right people of one's fitness to sit on the Court. Nor is it
an indictment of any Supreme Court Justice to say that one cannot get a seat on the Court
without being a successful politician because one has to wind through a special political
thicket in order to be nominated and confirmed. Once one is on the Court, politics still
matters in how one gets along with one's colleagues (which helps to maintain or preserve
coalitions); with the other branches (through testifying before appropriate congressional
committees to get more funds for the Court, to modify or block efforts to modify federal
jurisdiction, or to provide input on the federal rules of civil or criminal procedure or on the
sentencing guidelines, or through trying to get good law clerks or to place one's friends in
key governmental positions); or even with the press (in how one tries to preserve the image
of the Court or one's own self through interviews or off-the-record comments). Lastly, the
Court is a political institution in that its decisions have a great deal of impact on the
allocation of policymaking authority among the three branches of the federal government
and between the federal government and the states as well as on the general understanding
of the nation's most significant political document-the Constitution.
120. CARTER, supra note 2, at 152.
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displace or take priority over whether the nominee has proven excellence
in a relevant area of the law, demonstrated leadership or negotiation skills,
or engaged in significant public service. In fact, some of the people who
are commonly viewed as great Supreme Court Justices arguably lacked the
"right kind of moral instincts. '  For example, Hugo Black had been a
member of the Ku Klux Klan, 122 and Earl Warren arguably knew that his
order to detain Japanese-Americans, given during his tenure as Califor-
nia's Attorney General, had a dubious legal basis.
123
Third, confirming Supreme Court nominees on the basis of their "stron-
gest moral commitments" '124 will, contrary to Carter's hopes, 125 not make
the Court's controversial rulings easier to swallow nor produce greater
credibility for the Court. For example, the Warren Court has been vilified
for its activism ever since it decided Brown, even though most of its
members were well-respected men with substantial experience in public
service. The morals of the Justices who decided Brown did not save the
Court from being viciously attacked over the years; today, Brown is widely
hailed as a courageous and principled decision not because the people who
decided it are viewed as great "moral philosophers, 1 26 but rather because
the vast majority of Americans accept Brown as morally sound. Similarly,
many of the Justices in the majority of Roe v. Wade127 came to the Court
with strong moral commitments, which have not (yet) spared Roe or the
Court from virulent criticism.
Lastly, despite his insistence on the importance of focusing on nomi-
nees' qualifications, Carter never suggests any criteria for confirmable
positions. All he tells us about what "the right kind of moral instincts" are
for Justices is that "the nominee ought to be, in the judgment of the
Senate, an individual whose personal moral decisions seem generally
sound., 128 Carter's approach would allow senators to evaluate a nominee
121. Id. at 152. Carter quotes approvingly the following passage from Senator Paul
Simon's book about the Bork and Thomas hearings: "Supreme Court Justices are not saints
any more than Senators." Id. at 144 (quoting PAUL SIMON, ADVICE AND CONSENT: CLAR-
ENCE THOMAS, ROBERT BORK AND THE INTRIGUING HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
NOMINATION BATTLES 145 (1992)). Carter does not, however, appreciate the implications of
this citation for his preferred focus in judicial confirmations.
122. CARTER, supra note 2, at 144.
123. G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 75-77 (1982) (describing how
Chief Justice Warren later expressed regret over his role in the internment of Japanese-
Americans).
124. CARTER, supra note 2, at 114.
125. See id. at 150-55.
126. Id. at 152. Indeed, it is unclear how much the public knows about the moral
characters of the men who decided Brown.
127. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
128. CARTER, supra note 2, at 152. The one significant exception is his statement that
a lifelong habit of spending one's leisure time with those who prefer not to associate
with people of the wrong color tells something vitally important about the character
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based on their agreement with her lifestyle choices, although Carter him-
self argues that these decisions are constitutionally protected and none of
the government's business. 29 Furthermore, focusing on a nominee's moral
character contradicts Carter's stated desire to distinguish constitutional
interpretation from personal preference:13° if the Senate focuses on the
moral implications of a nominee's personal choices, the public may figure
that no meaningful distinction between constitutional interpretation and
personal preference exists.
131
IV. REFORMING THE CONFIRMATION MESS
A. THE APPROPRIATE SCOPE FOR REFORM OF THE SUPREME COURT
NOMINATION PROCESS
In discussing reform proposals for the confirmation process, Carter
focuses strictly on the Senate's role, and, even then, only on its perfor-
mance during Supreme Court confirmation hearings. He ignores an impor-
tant reality of the process: most nominations for the Court (or other
confirmable positions) are won or lost well before the Senate conducts
confirmation hearings. In practice, presidents generally do not nominate
people without some prior knowledge of the nominee's strengths and
weaknesses and a strategy for dealing with potential problems. In search-
ing for candidates to nominate, presidents or their advisers typically weed
out the most troublesome prospects.
Perhaps the most critical factor in assuring the success of a nomination
is a president's commitment to find a consensus candidate. 13 2 This requires
achieving some agreement beforehand on the qualifications for such a
and instincts of a would-be constitutional interpreter, something not easily dis-
avowed by so simple an expedient as ... resigning from [a] club.
Id.
129. See id. at 9, 170-71, 180-82.
130. See id. at 114-18.
131. It is also hard to tell how much practical difference focusing on a nominee's moral
commitments rather than on his or her ideology will make to the confirmation process. In
effect, Carter suggests that constitutional interpretation turns on a nominee's moral commit-
ments; hence, we should look at the latter to see how she will perform the former. Yet, if this
is Carter's point, he is simply asking us to look at a more reliable guide to how a judicial
nominee will rule than what the nominee has told the President or the Senate. Hence,
Carter might just be suggesting that, if we are concerned about ideology, we should not rely
on just what the nominee tells us she thinks. We should look at other indicia of judicial
philosophy, including speeches, articles, and the kinds of public service in which the
nominee has engaged. In other words, we should do roughly what we are already doing.
132. Another factor with the potential to complicate a nomination is the president's initial
characterization of a nominee. For instance, President Bush's announcement of Clarence
Thomas as "the best qualified" person in the country to replace Justice Marshall raised
public expectations for the nominee, who, as Carter suggests, "might, in time, have acquired
experience needed for service on the high court, [but] did not have it at the time of his
nomination." CARTER, supra note 2, at 137.
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nominee-something presidents can accomplish in various ways. For ex-
ample, President Ford, who instructed his Attorney General, Edward Levi,
to identify possible candidates for the Court without regard to "ideological
grounds, ' 133 provides a prominent example of such consensus building.
The White House narrowed Levi's list to exclude politically troublesome
candidates and chose Justice Stevens, who was confirmed by a vote of
98-0.134 Similarly, President Clinton's nominations of Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer won quick bipartisan support because he had directed the
White House Counsel to find well-qualified, distinguished non-ideologues,
and because he had consulted closely with key leaders in Congress and
elsewhere about the possible strengths and weaknesses of potential nomi-
nees.
135
133. Id. at 187 (citation omitted).
134. President Ford's nomination of Justice Stevens also shows the importance of an
experienced set of advisers with sound legal and political judgment. President Ford divided
responsibility for the nomination between the White House and the Justice Department,
with the latter charged with finding well-qualified candidates and the former responsible for
assessing the political ramifications of potential nominations. See Victor H. Kramer, The
Case of Justice Stevens: How to Select, Nominate, and Confirm a Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, 7 CONST. COMM. 325 (1990). In contrast, the Clinton administration has
placed primary authority for finding and assessing the political implications of prospective
Supreme Court nominees and to a lesser extent, federal appellate candidates, in the White
House Counsel's Office. At present, President Clinton's chief counsel is Abner Mikva, who
previously served with distinction as a representative from Illinois for eight years, and
subsequently as a federal court of appeals judge in the District of Columbia for 15 years.
Judge Mikva's political and judicial experiences qualify him, inter alia, to oversee the
administration's judicial selection work.
135. Of course, the unusual amount of time consumed in nominating Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer ultimately cost President Clinton politically. The reasons for the delays in
nominating those two Justices, as well as in filling other judicial vacancies, particularly
during the first 18 months of the administration, are attributable to excessive consultation,
see supra note 70 and accompanying text, and other factors. For example, the failed
nominations of Zoe Baird and Lani Guinier led the President and his advisers to be much
more cautious in nominating people. See Stephen Labaton, President's Judicial Appointments:
Diverse, but Well in the Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1994, at A15. Moreover, the delays
in naming a replacement for Baird created a vacuum in the administration that the White
House Counsel's office (as small as it is) had to fill in taking charge of federal district and
court of appeals vacancies, many of which extended well back into the days of the Bush
administration (which processed them solely in part to make sure its ideological assessments
of possible nominees were reliable). Once the Justice Department's political positions had
been filled, the Clinton administration picked up speed in filling some of those vacancies,
uniformly with consensus candidates. By the end of 1994, the President had appointed 129
lower court judges. His appointments have been praised for being generally better qualified
than those made by Presidents Reagan and Bush and for being more diverse than those
made by Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Carter (almost 60% of the Clinton appointees thus
far have been women or minorities, compared with 8% for Reagan and 27% for Carter). Id.
By the end of 1994, though, President Clinton still had to fill 57 judicial vacancies, some of
which dated back to before he took office. The price for not filling the latter judicial
openings sooner is that President Clinton must have all of the judicial nominations he makes
over the next two years processed by the Republican-controlled Senate that took charge
after the 1994 mid-term elections. Even though President Clinton's lower court appointees
THE CONFIRMATION MYSTERY
In contrast, a nomination is likely to flounder if a president wants to
challenge the Senate or to send a signal, regardless of the political costs.
For instance, after the Senate rejected his first choice to replace Justice
Fortas, President Nixon lost his temper and vowed to shove a nominee
down the Senate's throat.'36 He nominated Harold Carswell, a little-
known Florida judge who had only six months of experience on the United
States Court of Appeals and had publicly expressed support for white
supremacy and opposed desegregation orders as a United States Attorney.
The Senate rejected Carswell's nomination 51-45. Similarly, within a few
days of the Senate's rejection of Robert Bork, President Reagan tried to
nominate a similar idealogue who lacked Bork's paper trail. However,
President Reagan's haste, his loss of popularity due to the Iran-Contra
scandal, and his insistence on getting even with the Senate backfired when
the nominee, Judge Douglas Ginsburg, lost Republican support because
he had not disclosed in background interviews that he had smoked mari-
juana and his spouse had performed abortions in her medical -training.137
Once a nomination has encountered serious problems in confirmation
hearings, it is not necessarily beyond salvaging if broader political concerns
in the Senate that reach beyond the hearing itself favor the nominee's
approval. For example, President Bush figured that the Democratic major-
ity in the Senate would not dare to reject Clarence Thomas because, if
confirmed, Thomas would become the Court's only African-American
Justice. The nomination was designed in part to take the political heat off
President Bush for opposing the 1991 Civil Rights Act and shift the
spotlight to the Democrats, who claimed a superior commitment to minor-
ity concerns, including the need for affirmative action. 138 In spite of his
controversial record and Anita Hill's charges of sexual harassment, Justice
Thomas should be credited for saving his nomination through his testi-
mony before the Senate Judiciary Committee. His repeated emphasis on
his impoverished youth and the distance he had come,13 9 and especially his
characterization of the second phase of his confirmation hearings as a
"high-tech lynching," put opposing Democrats on the defensive, forcing
have been widely viewed as moderate, it is likely that those he makes during the remainder
of his first term will be more conservative than those he would have made had he acted more
quickly in filling judicial vacancies while the Senate was still controlled by his party.
136. Massey, supra note 60, at 7-8.
137. See generally ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION
SHOOK AMERICA 334-35 (1989).
138. See generally Gerhardt, supra note 103, at 977.
139. Justice Thomas' approach in his confirmation hearings has come to be known as
President Bush's "Pin Point strategy," which required Thomas to remind senators whenever
possible about his difficult childhood, his grandfather's heroic nurturing, and.the helpful
Catholic nuns at the Catholic schools he had attended in Pin Point, Georgia. See Richard L.
Berke, The Thomas Hearings: In Thomas' Hearing Room, Spirits of Hearing Past, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 1991, at A25.
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them to prove that their opposition was not racist. 140
B. THE QUESTIONABLE MERITS OF A SUPERMAJORITY REQUIREMENT FOR
SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATIONS
Despite Carter's tentative support for requiring a supermajority Senate
vote for the confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, this proposal has two
problems. 14' First, a supermajority rule would give a small faction-at least
one-third of the Senate-veto power over a Supreme Court nomination.
142
A nominee's opponents could more easily defeat a Supreme Court nomina-
tion because they would have to persuade fewer people than they have to
convince at present.
Second, Carter neglects to consider the Framers' reasons for requiring a
supermajority vote for removals and treaty ratifications, but not for confir-
mations. The Framers reserved a two-thirds supermajority voting require-
ment as a means of creating a presumption against certain decisions that it
expected to arise only infrequently, ensuring greater deliberation on a
matter, decreasing the chances for political or partisan reprisals on remov-
als and treaty ratifications, and protecting an unpopular minority from
being abused in Senate votes on these questions.1 43 On the other hand, the
140. Gerhardt, supra note 103, at 982-83, 989.
141. Carter also speculates about the implications for the confirmation process of eliminat-
ing life tenure altogether or replacing it with a constitutional amendment requiring term
limits or popular election for federal judges. He explains that life tenure, "along with the
immense and frustratingly distant power that it exercises, are what makes the Supreme
Court so attractive [a prize] and so frightening." CARTER, supra note 2, at 53. Nevertheless,
he concludes that, even though each of these measures would make Justices more account-
able to the electorate, life tenure should be preserved, because of its "obvious virtues,"
including the advantages that "[iut allows the accumulation of wisdom and experience[; i]t
promotes independence[; and] its existence encourages life service, thereby avoiding a
variety of potential improprieties." Id. at 200. Carter is surely correct that, if the American
people really want to make their federal judges politically accountable (and thus eliminate
the countermajoritarian difficulty), then they should support whichever of these measures
most appeal to them. He is to be commended for forthrightly asserting this point, which all
too few critics of the Court or of the confirmation process make. The critical question to ask
in response, he acknowledges, is the extent to which life tenure is necessary for ensuring the
protection of the countermajoritarian values enshrined in the Constitution. Although Carter
argues that the Court has backed down "in every era" when confronted with congressional
jurisdiction-stripping efforts or impeachment threats, id. at 108-12, he suggests that subject-
ing federal judges to popular election will rob them, as he maintains it has already robbed
most state court judges, of the necessary courage for enforcing countermajoritarian values.
Id. at 99-108.
142. Carter is mistaken that opponents of this proposal would argue that it may be "useful
that we have the occasional Justice who only squeaks by" and that "the proposal would make
it harder to pack the Court." Id. at 198. Neither of these arguments are directed at the real
problems with the proposal. Indeed, one proponent of the two-thirds supermajority vote for
Supreme Court confirmations admits that it "would inevitably increase the impact of special
interest groups because they would be able to block any nomination if they could garner the
support of one third of the Senate's members plus one." Massey, supra note 60, at 15.
143. See PETER HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA 102-06 (1984).
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Framers required only a simple majority for confirmations to balance the
demands of relatively efficient staffing of the government with the need to
check the discretion of both the president and the judiciary.
Despite Carter's suggestion that this rule would have changed the re-
sults of only a few Supreme Court confirmations in American history, 144 he
fails to note that the rule might also change the dynamics of confirmation
because each senator would know that her vote would have added weight
under such a system. Hence, Carter's claim that a supermajority vote
would not have kept a number of well-qualified people off the Court in
spite of their ideological diversity is mere speculation.1
45
C. REFORMING THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS
Carter admits that the constitutional structure for Supreme Court ap-
pointments is "not really broken, which is why so few of the proposed
repairs would make much difference., 146 Although he suggests that the
confirmation process could benefit from a change in certain public atti-
tudes,147 he never tells us how to effect such changes. His book is obviously
his most important contribution to that effort.
Yet, if the constitutional structure embodies a presumption of confirma-
tion that results in the focus on disqualifying factors, it is not clear how
changing public attitudes will shift that focus. If the current system does
not operate in the same manner as popular elections do, then the link
between changing public attitudes and correcting the process' specific
faults is also unclear.
Furthermore, as long as the President or the Senate is involved in the
confirmation process, the system remains subject to political forces. Within
such a system, one cannot mandate excellence or eloquence. Distortions
and misstatements are the price we pay for open, vigorous debate about
important political issues and events. A dispute that arises in a political
forum rather than in the pristine environment of a judge's chambers or a
classroom is unlikely to be pretty, polite, or linear. But none of this means
that the system fails to cut through to the real issues at stake, especially
when the President and the Senate can check each other's rhetoric and
mistakes. And if neither the President nor the Senate performs at their
144. This rule would have prevented the confirmations of Clarence Thomas, William
Rehnquist (for Chief Justice), Mahlon Pitney, Lucius Lamar, Stanley Mathews, Nathan
Clifford, John Catron, and Roger Taney (for Chief Justice).
145. CARTER, supra note 2, at 196-98. It is conceivable this rule might have prevented the
confirmations of other controversial nominees, such as Charles Evans Hughes (for Chief
Justice), Louis Brandeis, and Melville Fuller, each of whom was confirmed by barely more
than two-thirds of the Senate.
146. Id. at 206.
147. Id.
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respective best, the media and the public each have the means to keep the
system honest-the press by what they publish and the American people
by how they vote.
With all of this in mind, we should consider the feasibility of three
modest proposals for reforming the confirmation process, none of which
Carter discusses in his book. First, encouraging a president to choose a
consensus candidate (for any confirmable post) could pave the way for a
quick, uneventful confirmation. The problem with this proposal is that
backroom negotiations between the President and senators might conflict
with the value apparently placed by the Constitution in a process open and
accountable to the public. It is possible, for example, that consultations
could produce deals to keep certain harmful information about the nomi-
nee from the public or the media. Yet the eventual reaction to the Senate
Judiciary Committee's initial decision not to hold a separate hearing on
Anita Hill's sexual harassment allegations against Justice Thomas demon-
strates how such deals can be controlled.
The second proposal is to diminish the role of the nominee in confirma-
tion hearings. That nominations are often won or lost early in the process
could be taken as some proof (along with the prevailing practice, prior to
1925, of not calling the nominee to testify) that substantial input from the
nominee after her nomination is not necessary to make an informed
decision on the nominee's fitness to serve on the Court. No doubt, a
nominee should be given every opportunity to defend her reputation or
integrity in a public forum, but if the way has already been paved for a
nomination through good-faith consultation between the President and
key senators, then limiting the time for the nominee to testify or restricting
questions to a nominee's public record could well reduce the need for that
kind of hearing. Valuable information about the nominee could still be
produced for the public record through the testimony of people who know
the nominee and her record.
A third alternative is for the Senate to consider having professional
counsel ask questions for each side so that confirmation hearings could
become more efficient. However, there are two problems with this pro-
posal. On the one hand, its premise is that senators may not be adequately
discharging their constitutional responsibility, in which case we may con-
sider either electing different people to the Senate or doing away alto-
gether with the Senate's confirmation role. On the other hand, the people
hired to ask questions may try to score points in a confirmation proceeding
for no better reason than to justify their existence.
VI. CONCLUSION
For those unhappy with the confirmation process, The Confirmation
Mess is welcome news. The book spreads the fault for confirmation mis-
haps among the President (for raising unreasonable hopes about his nomi-
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nees' credentials and nominating overly ideological judicial nominees), the
media (for indulging the public's penchants for gossip and punishment),
the nominee (for saying too much), and the Senate (for focusing on
disqualifying factors and accepting a presumption of confirmation). Given
Carter's sweeping indictment of the confirmation process, it is puzzling
that he concludes that the system is not broken and that its improvement
requires merely changing the public's attitudes about government service,
sin, and the Supreme Court.
Yet the reason for Carter's surprisingly optimistic conclusion is no
mystery. His reverence for the Constitution forces him to choose either to
stick with the status quo (as he has described it) or to find an agent of
change. For Carter, the choice is clear. The status quo means confirmation
politics as usual, something for which Carter has little or no taste. The
other option allows Carter to acknowledge an individual's, and by exten-
sion the confirmation process', capacities for sin and redemption, to for-
give the American people for their trespasses, and, through that forgiveness,
to set the confirmation process on the path to salvation. In other words,
the key to cleaning up the confirmation mess is, for Carter, an act of
Christian charity.
However laudable Carter's faith, it ultimately fails to clarify the confirma-
tion process. Virtually everything that happens in the system can be
explained in political terms. This recognition is not a bad thing, nor does it
entail perverting the process. By constitutional design, the President and
the Senate must make decisions on federal appointments based on their
respective balancing of every nomination's short-term implications for the
advancement of the nominee, the President and his political party, and the
balance of power between the Senate and the President. Both actors must
also consider a nomination's long-range implications for federalism, the
institutional relationships among the branches of the federal government,
and the Constitution. Given that under this system the President has the
power to nominate and the Senate the authority to confirm or reject the
President's nominees, the President can be pro-active in this area, whereas
the Senate's posture is more defensive. Understood in this manner, the
confirmation process' salvation is political. But for anyone bent on substitut-
ing something other than politics as its unifying theme, the confirmation
process will remain a mystery.
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